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Abstract
The malicious or negligent use of unmanned aircraft systems 
(UAS) – usually referred to as ‘drones’ – gives rise to significant 
risks. While the risky behaviours are subject to existing legal 
sanctions, the apprehension of perpetrators can be difficult, and 
traditional regulatory controls, such as licensing drone operators, 
may be ineffective. ‘Counter-UAS’ (C-UAS) systems that defend 
against unmanned aerial systems are emerging internationally as 
a way to address the latent threat. Potential legal issues with the 
implementation of C-UAS in New Zealand are briefly surveyed. I 
propose the adoption of a licensing system for C-UAS similar to that 
already adopted in civil aviation regulation. 
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Recent research suggests that there may be over 280,000 New Zealand-resident drone users, with another 
200,000 overseas visitor users each year 
(Colmar Brunton, 2017).1 Behind these 
statistics, drones seemingly have an ever 
growing number of uses, but they also 
give rise to potentially significant risks that 
may not be managed well by our existing 
regulatory framework. A malicious actor 
could easily fly a drone into the path of 
an airliner, deliver contraband to prisons 
or drop an improvised explosive device 
over a sports stadium without ever 
being at risk of detection by authorities. 
A significant risk also exists that an 
individual who is negligent or reckless, 
rather than malicious, could also cause 
harm by flying into the path of an aircraft, 
or crashing at a public event. While all 
of the activities identified are subject to 
existing legal sanctions, the identification 
and apprehension of perpetrators can 
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be difficult, and traditional regulatory 
approaches, such as licensing drone 
operators, may be ineffective. This article 
considers the beneficial role of ‘counter-
UAS’ – systems intended to counter or 
defend against unmanned aerial systems 
– and proposes the adoption of a licensing 
system to enable counter-UAS (C-UAS) to 
be adopted in New Zealand.
The threat
In 2015 a small drone carrying radioactive 
material was flown onto the roof of the 
Japanese prime minister’s residence (BBC, 
2015). In the years since then unmanned 
aircraft have increased in sophistication: 
drones manufactured by DJI, the most 
popular brand of drone worldwide, have 
object avoidance technology, allowing 
them to be flown close to structures with 
minimal risk of collision. The Syrian civil 
war and the subsequent war against ISIS 
in Syria and Iraq has seen the use of small 
drones to drop improvised explosives and 
grenades (Gibbons-Neff, 2017; Watson, 
2017). However, the planned use of drones 
by non-state insurgent groups predates 
the Syrian civil war. For example, Ballard 
et al. (2001) report that in early 1994 the 
Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo attempted to 
use a remote-control helicopter to deliver 
the nerve agent sarin against a target; 
however, the helicopter crashed during 
testing (Bunker, 2015). Small drones have 
not, to date, been used in terror attacks in 
the West, but authorities are concerned 
that attempts will be made (Hughes, 2015). 
Small drones have been used to deliver 
contraband – particularly drugs, weapons 
and mobile phones – to prisons in both the 
United Kingdom (Glanfield, 2015) and the 
United States (Brandes, 2015). In the 
United Kingdom it was reported that 120 
drones were seized flying contraband into 
prisons over a 23-month period (Drury, 
2017). Drones have also been used to aid 
criminal activity, such as as reconnaissance 
for potential burglaries (Barrett, 2015). 
These concerns are equally relevant to New 
Zealand as they are to the United Kingdom 
and United States.
New Zealand has seen five recent 
incidents where the presence of drones 
closed airports and required manned 
aircraft to divert or enter a holding pattern. 
On 6 March 2018 a drone was observed in 
airspace near the approach path for aircraft 
landing at Auckland International Airport. 
Approximately 20 aircraft entered a holding 
pattern while air traffic control halted 
operations for 30 minutes, and a Boeing 
777 aircraft arriving from Japan diverted 
500km to Ohakea airbase to refuel (New 
Zealand Herald, 2018a). Less than three 
weeks later, on 25 March, a drone 
approached to within approximately five 
metres of another Boeing 777 landing at 
Auckland International Airport (Lawrence, 
2018). On 6 April 2018 a drone was seen at 
1,200ft above ground three nautical miles 
from Auckland International Airport, 
resulting in seven flights being delayed 
(Boyle, 2018). Three days later, on 9 April 
2018, operations at Whenuapai air force 
base were suspended when a drone came 
within 60m of a helicopter flying at 3,000ft 
above ground (New Zealand Herald, 
2018b). On 23 April a passenger flight was 
delayed at Tauranga because of a drone 
seen 1.6km from the end of the runway 
(Motion, 2018).
Simulation results suggest that a 3.6kg 
drone could fracture the turbine blades of 
a jet aircraft, rapidly destroying the entire 
engine (Mackay, 2015; Wasserman, 2015). 
Known as an ‘uncontained engine failure’, 
such an event can cause significant 
structural damage to the aircraft 
(Australian Transportation Safety Bureau, 
2013) and even a catastrophic fire, as 
occurred to a British Airways Boeing 777 
in Las Vegas in 2015 (Gates, 2015). On 17 
April 2018 a mid-air uncontained engine 
failure on a Boeing 737 aircraft in the 
United States resulted in the death of a 
passenger and injuries to eight others 
(National Transportation Safety Board, 
2018).
Drones are also of concern to light 
aircraft, including helicopters. Helicopters 
have characteristics that make them 
particularly vulnerable in the event of a 
collision with a drone: many have turbine 
engines subject to the same risk of 
destruction as airliner engines; main rotor 
blades can fracture on impact with a drone; 
and tail rotors are likely to be destroyed on 
impact with a drone, which could result in 
severe spinning of the helicopter. 
Helicopters also often operate at low level, 
in the same airspace as small drones, 
including for rescue and firefighting 
purposes. Due to the high risk of collision, 
and potential severity of the outcome, 
helicopter firefighting operations are 
suspended if a drone is seen close to the 
firefighting operations (Stuff, 2017).
On a purely economic front, electric 
power infrastructure, particularly overhead 
power lines and outdoor switchyards, is 
vulnerable in the event of a drone crash. 
Careless rather than malicious use of small 
drones has resulted in power outages of 
varying severity. Drones have crashed into 
overhead power lines, causing power 
outages affecting hundreds of people 
(Farivar, 2015; Serna, 2015; Green, 2017) 
and even starting a fire and damaging 
vehicles (Brilbeck, 2017). In New Zealand, 
a drone caused a power outage affecting 
200 homes in 2015 (Stuff, 2015). While 
more power outages are currently caused 
by cars crashing into power poles than by 
drones, the potential for a drone to fly into 
the switchyard of a major substation or 
power station means that the potential 
effect of a drone is much greater than that 
of a car.
Existing regulatory provisions
Drones are regulated as aircraft under 
the Civil Aviation Act 1990, and subject 
to the provisions of the Civil Aviation 
Rules (2015), part 101. Part 101 specifies 
On a purely economic front, electric 
power infrastructure, particularly 
overhead power lines and outdoor 
switchyards, is vulnerable in the event of 
a drone crash. 
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restrictions such as not flying higher than 
400ft above ground level, not flying over 
people without their consent, not flying 
over property without the consent of the 
occupier or owner, not flying within 4km 
of an aerodrome without the agreement of 
the aerodrome operator, and not flying in 
controlled airspace without the approval 
of air traffic control.
Research conducted for the Civil 
Aviation Authority found that 56% of New 
Zealand-resident drone users and 55% of 
overseas-resident drone users in New 
Zealand self-identified as being aware of 
the rules and having at least a basic 
knowledge of those rules (Colmar Brunton, 
2017). For New Zealand-resident drone 
users, awareness of specific rules ranged 
between 56% and 78% of users, with only 
35–59% always complying with those rules.
Need for further measures
Drone users may cause significant harm, 
whether through ignorance, negligence, 
recklessness or intentional acts. Licensing 
may help solve the problem of ignorance, 
and may reduce negligence, but is unlikely 
to solve the problem of recklessness or 
intentional acts.
From a law and economics perspective, 
the law (and the attendant penalties for 
breaking the law) results in individuals 
internalising the social costs of their actions, 
and generally making more socially 
efficient decisions as a result. However, the 
characteristics of drones are such that it 
may be extremely difficult to identify and 
locate the operator of an errant drone; 
hence, laws may often be unenforceable 
against a drone operator. It is impossible 
to enforce a law if the perpetrator cannot 
be found. 
Even if the perpetrator could be found 
and apprehended, appropriate incentives 
require a willingness by the courts to 
impose sanctions that reflect the 
seriousness of the harm or potential harm. 
In the realm of workplace safety, the New 
Zealand courts have considered it 
‘abhorrent to calculate in dollar terms’ the 
value of a life,2 and reparations ordered by 
the courts have only been a small fraction 
of the $4.21 million value of a statistical 
life calculated by the Ministry of Transport 
(2017). 
If the courts did award a sum reflective 
of that value, properly adjusted for 
probability of detection (Polinsky and 
Shavell, 1992), the amount would be so 
high that perpetrators would essentially be 
judgment proof and there would still be 
insufficient deterrence against operating a 
drone in a dangerous manner. In such 
circumstances some form of ex ante 
regulation is appropriate to reduce the 
likelihood of harm occurring (Shavell, 
1984). For drones, relevant measures 
include licensing and C-UAS.
Licensing is insufficient
Licensing is common to a number of 
activities that are considered to pose 
a hazard to third parties. For example, 
licenses are required to drive cars, fly 
aeroplanes and possess firearms, even if 
the relevant activities are to be performed 
privately. Licensing is typically coupled 
with a knowledge test, and consequently 
could eliminate the knowledge deficit 
evident in the Colmar Brunton (2017) 
survey.
However, licensing, even when coupled 
with surveillance and enforcement, does 
not prevent unlicensed individuals from 
engaging in the activity, or licensed 
individuals from undertaking the activity 
in an unsafe manner. For example, both 
cars and drivers are licensed. In a random 
survey of 746 vehicles being driven in 
Auckland, 79% of drivers elected to 
participate in the survey, and of those 
drivers 1.1% were unlicensed (Blows et al., 
2005). Notwithstanding the prohibition on 
using a hand-held cell phone while driving, 
in the 2017 calendar year the New Zealand 
Police recorded 23,412 offences of using a 
hand-held device for calling or texting 
while driving (New Zealand Police, 2018).
Thirty five per cent of New Zealand 
drone users do not consider that drones 
pose a risk to aviation safety (Colmar 
Brunton, 2017), which suggests that they 
would also view enforcement of the 
relevant Civil Aviation Rules as lacking 
legitimacy. Watling and Leal (2012) report 
statistically significant negative correlations 
between the likelihood of violating specific 
driving laws and the perceived legitimacy 
of enforcement of that particular law. It 
therefore seems likely that licencing of 
drone operators would not solve the 
problem of compliance.
Licensing also does not change the fact 
that the casual bystander will not be able 
to determine who is flying a particular 
drone, let alone whether the pilot is licensed 
or unlicensed. There is, therefore, likely to 
be an ongoing problem of potentially 
hazardous use of drones, and this problem 
is likely to persist regardless of any licensing 
regime that may be proposed.
Counter-UAS technology
Against this backdrop it would seem to 
be common sense that action should be 
taken to restrict the ability of drones to 
operate in certain circumstances. As with 
most issues of human safety, prevention 
of harm is generally preferable to allowing 
the harm to occur and then compensating 
the victims’ families or punishing the 
perpetrator. Thus, in the health and safety 
arena the best control is considered to 
be elimination of a hazard, and the next 
best control is to isolate the hazard so 
that people are physically separated from 
it. The use of explicit regulatory controls 
is particularly relevant when private 
parties are incapable of paying for the full 
magnitude of harm done (Shavell, 1984).
In an ideal world, therefore, we might 
envisage the use of a force field to exclude 
drones from an area where there was a high 
risk of harm being caused, thus meeting 
As with most issues of human safety, 
prevention of harm is generally preferable 
to allowing the harm to occur and then 
compensating the victims’ families or 
punishing the perpetrator. 
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the health and safety requirement to isolate 
people from the hazard. While force fields 
remain the realm of science fiction, 
technology exists that can take control of 
errant drones, forcing them to land in a 
safe area or potentially destroying the 
intruding drone.
One option is the use of radio or GPS 
jamming. Radio jamming involves the use 
of ‘a radio transmitter ... to disrupt or pre-
vent the reception of radiocommunica-
tions’ (New Zealand Gazette, 2011). This 
basic principle can be applied to disrupt 
the control signal from a transmitter or 
ground control station to a drone. A num-
ber of commercial jammers are available 
for drones, such as the Battelle Systems 
‘Drone Defender’ shoulder-mounted radio 
‘gun’ (Matyszczyk, 2015), the hand-held 
‘Dronebuster’ by Radio Hill Technologies 
(Blighter Surveillance Systems, 2016), and 
the DroneShield ‘DroneGun’ deployed by 
Australia at the 2018 Commonwealth 
Games (Cooper, 2018).
The Blighter Surveillance Systems ‘Anti 
UAV Defence System’ (AUDS) is a much 
larger, military-grade C-UAS which utilises 
radar to detect drones at a range of up to 
10km for larger drones, and smaller drones 
at a range of up to 3.6km (Blighter 
Surveillance Systems, 2017). Another large-
scale detection and jamming system has 
been developed by Airbus Defense and 
Space (Airbus, 2015).
US/Australian firm Department 13 has 
developed a radio-based system called 
‘Mesmer’ that does not utilise jamming 
(Department 13, 2017). This system relies 
on what Department 13 describes as 
‘protocol manipulation’ (Department 13, 
2016), which involves intercepting the 
radio signals used to control the drone, 
identifying the protocol being used, then 
transmitting commands to completely take 
over control of the drone. The drone can 
then be instructed to leave the area or to 
land in a safe zone.
Some drones would make it through 
such electronic controls, so a second layer 
of defensive measures may also be required 
in some circumstances. Firearms and lasers 
can both be used to knock a drone out of 
the sky (Rees, 2018). Another option is the 
C-UAS grenade which releases streamers 
that will foul a drone’s propellers, causing 
it to crash (Wong, 2018).
A number of alternative methods of 
drone interdiction have been developed 
which neither knock the drone out of the 
sky nor utilise jamming. Eagles have been 
trained to hunt small drones in both the 
Netherlands (Zhang, 2016; Cade, 2016) 
and France (Samuel, 2016; Roberts, 2017). 
Nets may also be used to entangle a drone: 
nets may be shoulder-launched 
(OpenWorks, 2016), draped from a drone 
(Economist, 2015) or fired from a drone 
(Goodrich, 2016; Goppert et al., 2017; 
Horiuchi et al., 2016). 
International experience
Other countries have already taken steps 
to allow or enable the use of C-UAS. As 
noted earlier, Australia deployed C-UAS 
for the Commonwealth Games. The 
United States is undertaking trials of the 
AUDS system at selected airports (Waitt, 
2016), and the United Kingdom reportedly 
used the AUDS system to protect against 
drones at the royal wedding in May 2018 
(Williams, 2018). Like New Zealand, all of 
these countries are subject to the Montreal 
Convention (see below), so the convention 
need not prove a barrier to taking action 
against drones. 
The United States has recently enacted 
legislation that explicitly allows a range of 
actions to be taken against drones that 
potentially threaten the safety or security 
of a broad range of assets or facilities. The 
National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2018 (2017) allows action to be 
taken against drones that potentially 
threaten assets or facilities related to 
national security. Additional legislation has 
been introduced into Congress to enable 
the Department of Justice and the 
Department of Homeland Security to also 
take action against drones in a wide range 
of circumstances, including ‘penal, 
detention, correctional, and judicial 
operations’ and ‘mass gatherings or events 
that are reasonably assessed by the 
Department of Justice to be a potential 
target for terrorism or other criminal 
activity’ (the Safeguarding America’s Skies 
Act, 2018). The actions allowed by both 
pieces of legislation include warning the 
operator, seizing control of the drone, 
destroying the drone, and the like. 
Importantly, these provisions relate to 
assets or facilities located in the United 
States or its territories, and are therefore 
focused on domestic security rather than 
security during war or war-like situations. 
Legal issues
The biggest difficulty with implementing 
C-UAS in New Zealand is not the 
technology but the legal environment. 
The Aviation Crimes Act 1972, the 
Radiocommunications Regulations 
(Prohibited Equipment – Radio Jammer 
Equipment) Notice 2011 (New Zealand 
Gazette, 2011) and the Crimes Act 1961 all 
potentially raise impediments to C-UAS.
While not all C-UAS technologies will 
damage or destroy a drone, many do. A 
drone that is executing a pre-programmed 
flight path may also be unresponsive to the 
technologies that would seek to gain 
control and redirect it to another location. 
However, a drone is considered to be an 
aircraft, and hence subject to the same 
regulatory provisions as all other aircraft. 
The Montreal Convention (United Nations, 
1975) prohibits any person from destroying 
an ‘aircraft in service’ or causing ‘damage 
to an aircraft in service which renders the 
aircraft incapable of flight’. While the 
Montreal Convention includes the 
qualification that these acts are performed 
‘unlawfully and intentionally’, New 
Zealand’s codifying legislation – the 
Aviation Crimes Act 1972 – omits this 
qualification and specifies a maximum 
term of imprisonment of 14 years. These 
prohibitions are clearly reasonable in 
respect of manned aircraft, but less 
obviously so in respect of unmanned 
The biggest difficulty with implementing 
[counter-UAS] in New Zealand is not the 
technology but the legal environment. 
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aircraft operating in an area where they 
have potential to cause significant harm.
Important questions remain as to what 
C-UAS measures can legitimately be 
adopted. Under the Radiocommunications 
Regulations the jamming of radio 
communications is prohibited unless the 
person holds a licence allowing the use of 
radio jammer equipment. The only entity 
licensed to operate jamming devices is the 
Department of Corrections, which means 
that equipment that can jam drone control 
signals could potentially be used at prisons 
but nowhere else. Should this restriction 
remain, or should other security agencies 
also be able to utilise jamming devices in 
certain circumstances? 
Protocol manipulation systems which 
seize control of a drone avoid the problems 
attendant with destroying or damaging a 
drone, but potentially contravene the 
prohibitions in the Crimes Act of 
interfering with a computer system (section 
250) and accessing a computer system 
without authorisation (section 252). The 
vendor of such a system could potentially 
contravene the prohibition against making, 
selling or distributing software ‘that would 
enable another person to access a computer 
system without authorisation’ (section 
251). The sale and use of such systems 
would therefore appear to require an 
explicit recognition in law that C-UAS are 
exempt from this prohibition. 
The law generally recognises a right to 
the use of reasonable force in self-defence 
and in defence of others, with common law 
defences recognised by section 20 of the 
Crimes Act and specific defences recognised 
in sections 39–43 and section 48, among 
others. From an economic perspective, 
reasonableness and proportionality suggest 
that the cost associated with an action 
should not be greater than the benefit 
achieved from the action. This economic 
test requires that the expected (i.e. 
probability weighted) cost of any harm to 
third parties is included in the cost of self-
defence. Self-defence that complies with 
this restriction will be efficient. The 
economics suggests that taking preventive 
action against drones is likely to be efficient 
(and thus reasonable or proportionate) in 
situations where a high magnitude of harm 
could result, such as at major airports, mass 
gatherings or critical national infrastructure. 
In the event of a shooting in defence of 
another, the defences in the Crimes Act 
have been considered sufficient to avoid 
police officers being charged for 
accidentally killing a third party who 
happened to be in the line of fire 
(Independent Police Conduct Authority, 
2012). Thus, these defences might generally 
provide protection for any counter-UAS 
action taken where the party taking action 
believed that there was an imminent threat 
to people – such as when a drone is flying 
in the approach path of an airliner, or 
towards or over a mass gathering, or into 
a protected area around a VIP – and some 
harm to a third party occurs as a result of 
the C-UAS action.
However, there are circumstances in 
which the legal basis for taking action is 
less clear. Consider, for example, C-UAS 
action taken against a drone flying in the 
approach path to an airport, but there is 
no airliner approaching. In the absence of 
imminent harm to people the C-UAS 
action might not be the use of reasonable 
force, and might instead be considered 
reckless and subject to prosecution under 
the Crimes Act. Inter alia, recklessness 
requires knowledge of the type of harm 
that might occur (France, n.d., section 
CA20.27), but not necessarily that the risk 
is seen as significant or likely to eventuate 
(ibid., section CA20.26). Prosecutions for 
reckless conduct are also possible under 
section 47 of the Health and Safety at Work 
Act 2015, without any necessity for harm 
to have occurred.
Prosecution requires a decision by the 
relevant prosecuting authority that it is in 
the public interest for a prosecution to 
occur. It is possible that the prosecuting 
authority may decide that a particular 
C-UAS action not be prosecuted. However, 
that does not provide certainty as to future 
non-prosecution, and may instead simply 
serve to allow a pattern of behaviour to 
develop that strengthens the future case for 
a public interest prosecution. Furthermore, 
it is untenable for law enforcement agencies 
to rely on such a strategy. As Chief Justice 
Sian Elias stated in Hamed v R (2011):
The courts cannot remedy the 
deficiency [of explicit legislative 
authority] through approval of police 
action taken in the absence of lawful 
authority without destruction of 
important values in the legal system, to 
the detriment of the freedoms 
guaranteed to all.3
It could be argued that trespass might 
provide an avenue for taking action against 
errant drones. There are, however, a 
number of complexities in the practical 
application of trespass to drones (Shelley, 
2016). Trespass also provides no assistance 
when the drone is operating other than 
above the land where the protected activity 
takes place, such as when operating in the 
approach path to an airport or in controlled 
airspace generally.
Proposal
The legal issues described above suggest 
that specific legislative authority may be 
required for C-UAS, as has occurred in 
the United States. The relevant legislative 
changes need not be ‘all or nothing’. As 
with other potentially hazardous activities, 
Trespass ... provides no assistance
when the drone is operating other than
above the land where the protected 
activity takes place, such as when 
operating in the approach path to 
an airport or in controlled airspace 
generally.
A Framework for Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Regulation in New Zealand
Policy Quarterly – Volume 14, Issue 3 – August 2018 – Page 79
the ability to operate could be restricted 
to those who have been licensed to do so. 
In general terms, it is efficient to set an 
ex ante regulatory framework coupled 
with potential ex post liability (Kolstad, 
Ulen and Johnson, 1990). The standards 
specified in regulation are minimum 
standards, requiring less than the socially 
optimal level of precaution (ibid.). The 
threat of ex post liability, provided by the 
prospect of being required to defend in 
court the reasonableness of actions taken, 
then ensures an efficient outcome.
The standard licensing model employed 
by the Civil Aviation Authority and by the 
New Zealand Space Agency is consistent 
with the theoretical ideal. The relevant 
regulations generally specify a minimum 
level of safety, but complying with those 
regulations does not absolve the licence 
holder from liability arising under the Civil 
Aviation Act 1990, the Health and Safety at 
Work Act 2015, or tort. Furthermore, the 
licence must specify how they will comply 
with the relevant regulations, which 
enables the licence holder to elect operating 
procedures that are most efficient for their 
specific circumstances. 
The same approach could be adopted 
for the operation of C-UAS: a regulation 
for obtaining a licence for the operation of 
C-UAS could be promulgated, with 
potential operators of C-UAS being 
required to submit operating procedures 
for approval in order to obtain a licence. 
The licensing process adopted by the Civil 
Aviation Authority issues operator licences 
for a maximum period of five years, 
ensuring that the licensed entity is subject 
to regular regulatory scrutiny. As C-UAS 
technology matures the need for licences 
may be obviated, or alternatively the 
increasing capabilities of C-UAS may 
reinforce the need for such systems.
For the time being, radio jamming 
should be reserved to security agencies, but 
rather than a blanket authorisation being 
granted to those agencies, it may be more 
appropriate to require that an agency 
obtain an authorisation from the C-UAS 
regulator and from the Radio Spectrum 
Management group. The literature suggests 
that such a dual oversight model may be 
more efficient than a single unified 
regulator (Laffont and Martimort, 1999), 
primarily because it reduces the possibility 
of regulatory capture.
Conclusion
The policy issues to be addressed in 
relation to C-UAS are not particularly 
difficult. The right to peaceful use of 
a drone does not override the right of 
others to go about their daily lives free 
from harm, and there are circumstances 
in which it is clearly efficient to allow 
self-defence against drones. We put 
fences around high lookouts and along 
cliff edges to prevent people falling; we 
regulate to require isolation of dangerous 
machinery; we can and should implement 
policy now that allows relevant parties to 
implement systems to reduce the potential 
for drone-related harm by preventing 
drones from accessing the areas where 
they will cause most harm. There should 
never be the opportunity for drones to fly 
in the approach and departure paths of 
our major airports, major infrastructure 
should be protected from errant drones, 
and people should be able to attend events 
and gatherings free from the prospect of 
drones being an agent of harm. There are 
important questions about the range of 
measures that can and should be used for 
C-UAS, but a flexible licensing system may 
be the most appropriate way to address 
such questions.
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